WORK IN PROGRESS


Managerial Poaching and Talent Reallocation
submitted to the Journal of Political Economy

with Thomas Jungbauer, Daniela Scur, and Yi Chen [WORKING PAPER] [SSRN] 

Abstract: Managers are an important component of positive talent reallocation: when a manager is poached, workers tend to follow. Using the universe of formal sector contracts in Brazil, we document that the co-movement of workers following a managerial poaching event is substantially larger than following a non-managerial one. We propose that managers hold high-quality personnel-specific information about workers that goes beyond what is observable to outside firms. We formalize this in a model of managerial poaching with asymmetric employer learning, in which more productive firms poach managers for their information about workers and subsequently raid high-ability employees. We derive testable predictions and show that the data supports each of them. In equilibrium, information rents lead to inefficiently low poaching, making managers both a catalyst for efficient worker reallocation and a hindrance to it reaching its welfare-optimal level. 

Presentations and Conferences (co-authors): Finger Lakes Labor Conference, Society for Institutional & Organizational Economics, Organizational Economics Workshop [Sydney], NBER Summer Institute Personnel Economics [Boston], Labor Workshop [Cornell], NBER Organizational Economics Spring Meetings [Boston], Empirical Management Conference [Harvard], University of Vienna, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Indiana University, Organization@Cornell [Cornell], Southern Economic Association [Washington, DC], Monash University, Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration, University of Hong Kong.